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THE S.E.C. AND REGULATION OF
FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUERS: ANOTHER
MISSED OPPORTUNITY AT MEANINGFUL
REGULATORY CHANGE
I. INTRODUCTION
The observation that world financial markets have and
continue to become more internationalized is no longer novel.
However, a few statistics will illustrate the continued broaden-
ing of the phenomena. Near the end of 1993, U.S. investors
were purchasing approximately $2 billion of foreign securities
per week or engaged in a total of $560 billion in gross trades of
foreign securities for the year.' In contrast, U.S. investors
purchased approximately $2 billion of foreign securities per
year from 1985 to 1990.2 By 1996, total purchases and sales of
foreign securities by U.S. investors totaled $12.4 trillion.3 To
date, there is little evidence to show that the trend is abating.
Yet, while United States capital markets are the model of
"size, sophistication [and] liquidity," which explains much of
their attraction to domestic and foreign investors and issuers,
these actors do have the option of looking to competing capital
markets to satisfy their economic needs.4 Moreover, financial
economists posit that investors and issuers will not utilize
markets where the marginal costs of additional regulation
exceed the marginal benefits of such regulation.5 Because in-
ternationalization has facilitated a network of different regula-
tory regimes from which investors and issuers all over the
1. See Todd Cohen, The Regulation of Foreign Securities: A Proposal to
Amend the Reconciliation Requirement and Increase the Strengths of Domestic Mar-
kets, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 491.
2. See id.
3. See Uri Geiger, Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global
Market-A Proposal, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1786 (1998).
4. See Nicholas G. Demmo, Comment, U.S. Securities Regulation: The Need
for Modification to Keep Pace with Glogalization, 17 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 691,
691-92 (1994).
5. See James D. Cox, Rethinking U.S. Securities Laws in the Shadow of
International Regulatory Competition, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 159-65
(1992).
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globe may choose, the economic implication of a regulator's
decision is important with regard to the competitiveness of its
capital markets.6
As the nature and breadth of the international securities
markets continues to change in radical ways, U.S. regulators
have accomplished little to address issuer informational disclo-
sure requirements implicated by these changes.7 The United
States Securities and Exchange Commission (S.E.C.) has had
ample opportunity to view the foreign issuer component of its
mandatory disclosure regime as a template from which to ex-
periment with policy change. On February 2, 1999, however,
the S.E.C. perhaps recognized that regulatory change is inevi-
table in order to maintain the United States' position as the
globe's preeminent securities market. On this date, the S.E.C.
announced proposed rulemaking with respect to disclosure re-
quirements of international issuers offering securities in the
U.S.' The S.E.C. announced these rulemaking proposals in
reaction to the phenomenal internationalization of securities
markets while touting the broad policies of protecting inves-
tors, decreasing the cost of capital to foreign issuers, and facili-
tating the cross-border flows of capital.'
One result of the internationalization of securities markets
has been increased competition among the various national
markets for the attraction of both foreign investors and issu-
ers.1" How a given jurisdiction chooses to regulate its markets
is critical because capital ultimately flows to the market with
"the least government intervention, the highest liquidity, the
lowest transaction costs.., and the lowest tax burden."" The
S.E.C. has recognized that overprotection of investors could
result in the lessening of the competitiveness of U.S. capital
6. See Demmo, supra note 4, at 706-08.
7. See Geiger, supra note 3, at 1786.
8. See Exchange Act Release No. 34-41014 (Feb. 2, 1999); Securities Act
Release No. 33-7637 (Feb. 2, 1999), both available in 1999 WL 44076 (S.E.C.)
[hereinafter International Disclosure Proposals].
9. See id at 1-4. Section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 requires the
S.E.C. to consider the promotion of efficiency, competition, and capital formation
when engaged in rulemaking. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1994 & Supp. IV 1999).
10. See Andreas J. Roquette, New Developments Relating to the Internation-
alization of the Capital Markets: A Comparison of Legislative Reforms in the Unit-





markets at the same time emphasizing that it will not engage
in a regulatory "race to the bottom" 2 of reporting standards
in attempt of improving the attractiveness of the U.S. markets
to foreign issuers. 3 Thus, herein lies the dilemma: does the
S.E.C.'s concern of a regulatory race to the bottom preclude the
U.S. securities markets from maintaining their hegemony or
shall the S.E.C. adapt its rules to the dynamics of an ever
changing world market for securities?
Part II of this Note will discuss the history of how the
S.E.C. and other regulators have approached the phenomena of
increasing internationalization of securities markets and the
current state of the law in the U.S. Part III of this Note argues
that although the S.E.C.'s proposed rulemaking is an appropri-
ate method to address the dynamics of the internationalization
of the securities markets, economic information theory sug-
gests that the S.E.C.'s rulemaking effort falls short of optimiz-
ing the goals of protecting investors, decreasing the cost of
capital to foreign issuers, and facilitating the cross-border
flows of capital. Part IV of this Note proposes an alternative
that would more effectively protect investors' interests, de-
crease the cost of capital to foreign issuers, and facilitate the
cross-border flows of capital.
II. BACKGROUND/HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL ISSUERS
A. Basic Tenets of United States Securities Laws.
The law governing securities in the U.S. is primarily gov-
erned by the Securities Act of 1933"4 (Securities Act) and the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934"s (Exchange Act). These
two Acts are supplemented by the individual states' "blue-
sky" 6 laws. The Security Act and Exchange Act serve to pro-
12. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International
Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1855, 1872-
1874 (1997) (describing how nations will have a continuing incentive to lower
disclosure standards as a result of competing with other nations to attract more
capital into their securities markets).
13. See Roquette, supra note 10, at 570.
14. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a, et seq. (1994).
15. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq. (1994).
16. The term "blue-sky" is in reference to speculative schemes which have no
basis other than to so many feet of the blue sky. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
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tect investors by focusing on issuers' responsibility to disclose
material information bearing upon an investor's transactional
decision." A primary purpose of the Exchange Act is to make
available to investors firm-specific information, known ofily by
firm's management. 8 This purpose is served by requiring his-
torical disclosure of company-specific information, imposing
administrative oversight by the S.E.C. of such disclosure, and
potential heightened fraud liability. 9 Another purpose of the
Exchange Act is to require similar disclosure from registered
issuers on a continual basis under S.E.C. oversight." While
debate about the importance of information disclosure began in
the early 1900's, it was the pall of the stock market collapse
and subsequent Great Depression that provided the "political
momentum" necessary for Congress to enact the Securities Act
in 1933, and the Exchange Act in 1934.21
From these landmark pieces of legislation emerged the
cornerstones upon which securities laws in the United States
rest. These cornerstones are the notions of registration, full
and fair disclosure of material information, and the prevention
of fraud in relation to the offerings and sales of securities.
Securities law scholars often group registration and full and
fair disclosure of material information into the general concept
of "mandatory disclosure" which refers to information required
of issuers offering new securities and information required of
registered issuers when making various reports to sharehold-
ers.2 3 Securities law scholars additionally posit that United
166 (7th ed. 1999).
17. See Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities
Offerings: Analysis of Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20
MICH. J. INT'L L. 207, 210 (Winter 1999).
18. See SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1968) (positing that one purpose of the regulato-
ry scheme of the Exchange Act is to essentially solve the problem of information
asymmetry when the investor is making a purchase or sale decision).
19. See Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in Securities Offerings,
1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 9.
20. See Cohen, supra note 1, at 497.
21. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS
3-8 (2d ed. 1997). For an interesting discussion of the "political roots" of various
New Deal legislation, see MARC J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS WEAK OWNERS: THE
POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 26-49 (1994).
22. See Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 17, at 210. One might argue that
the prevention of fraud in relation to the offering and sales of securities and full
and fair disclosure are corollaries.
23. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE SEC AND THE FUTURE OF FINANCE 248, n.2
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States securities laws have generally gone through a slow evo-
lutionary process shadowing changes in the economy, finance
theory, and the costs of mandatory reporting requirements
upon entities seeking access to capital markets.24 However, as
growth of foreign capital markets and the Internet continue to
challenge the hegemony of the United States capital market,
United States regulators must be aware that this slow evolu-
tionary process in relation to foreign issuers seeking access to
the U.S. capital markets may not be proper.
B. History of Domestic Regulation of Foreign Issuers
Until 1974, the S.E.C. did not perceive a need to adopt
new reporting forms or rules in response to offerings by foreign
private issuers of securities. Prior to 1974, however, as U.S.
investors' interest in foreign investment began to pique, S.E.C.
Chairman Manuel F. Cohen foresaw that the time would soon
come to recognize the notion of an international securities
market.26 Subsequently, the S.E.C. approached the interna-
tionalization of securities markets in view of the traditional
policy of protecting investors while balancing the competing
consideration of facilitating transnational flows of capital.
Recognizing the latter competing goal, the S.E.C. ac-
knowledged that building flexibility into the reporting require-
ments of foreign issuers was the order of the day.2" Moreover,
the S.E.C. has conceded that it has historically treated foreign
issuers in a different manner than U.S. issuers. 29 The S.E.C.'s
explanation as to its seemingly favorable treatment of foreign
issuers, when compared with seasoned U.S. issuers, has not
been adequately explained and arguably runs afoul of the
(1985).
24. See id. at 245.
25. See Joel Seligman, The Mandatory Disclosure System and Foreign Firms, 4
PAc. Rim L. & POLY J. 807, 812 (1995).
26. See id. at 813. See also Manuel F. Cohen, Toward an International Secu-
rities Market, 5 LAW & POLY INT'L BUS. 357, 397 (1973).
27. See Rules, Registration and Annual Report Form for Foreign Private Issu-
ers, Exchange Act Release No. 16,371, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 9 82,363 (Nov. 21, 1979).
28. See id.
29. See Integrated Disclosure System for Foreign Private Issuers, Securities
Act Release No. 6360 [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91
83,054, at 84,643 (Nov. 20, 1981).
2000]
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S.E.C.'s general statements of policy."0
Although the S.E.C.'s proactive approach to regulating
foreign private issuers in light of the internationalization of
securities markets is a relatively recent occurrence, U.S. inves-
tors had access to foreign equity investments in the form of
American Depository Receipts3' (ADRs), which have been
available on U.S. exchanges since 1927.2 ADRs are available
to U.S. investors on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the
National Association of Securities Dealers Automatic Quota-
tion System (NASDAQ), the American Stock Exchange (AMX)
and over-the-counter in the "pink sheet" market. 3 During the
late 1970's, the S.E.C. created forms F-, 4 F-2,3 5 F-3,' 6 F-
30. See Palmiter, supra note 19, at 48-49. Palmiter presents the following
syllogism of mandatory disclosure and ultimately argues that if the syllogism does
not apply to foreign issuers, it ought to be reexamined with respect to U.S. issu-
ers:
Premises
1. Management knows more about the issuer and its prospects than
do investors.
2. Disclosure by management enables investors to more accurately
price expected returns and risks, and thus distinguish between good
and bad investments.
3. Disclosure cannot be left to private contracting since managers
cannot be counted on to voluntarily disclose price-sensitive informa-
tion, particularly bad news or revelations embarrasing to manage-
ment; investors cannot be expected to demand the information they
need.
Conclusion
Therefore, to ensure accurate pricing and proper capital allocation,
disclosure must be compelled through a system of ex-ante govern-
ment mandates and supervision, as well as heightened ex-post liabili-
ty and government enforcement.
Id. at 16-17 [footnotes omitted].
31. ADRs are documents that represent ownership of either a share or shares
of a foreign issuer which a foreign branch of a U.S. bank holds on behalf of an
investor. See Ian J. Giddy, GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETs 439 (1994). The foreign
analog to ADR's are coined as international depository receipts (IDR's). Id.
32. See Lonnie S. Keene, Note, Globalization and Competition: A Proposal to
Liberalize Foreign Securities Disclosure Regulation, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L & POL'Y 337,
344 (1997). ADR's remain the predominant choice among foreign private issuers to
gain access to the U.S. Capital markets. Id.
33. See Mark A. Saunders, Amercan Depository Receipts: An Introduction to
U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign Companies, 17 FORDHAM INTVL L. J. 48, 57
(1993). Before 1971, generally all over-the-counter (OTC) orders were recorded
manually on so-called "pink sheets." After 1971, the National Association of Secu-
rity Dealers created the automated trading system known as NASDAQ and there-
by significantly reduced the amount of over-the-counter activity recorded by "pink
sheets." See Zvi BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 84 (3rd ed. 1996) [hereinafter BODIE
ET AL.].
34. 17 C.F.R. § 239.31 (1999).
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4,7 and F-6"5 (applicable to ADR's) by which foreign private
issuers could register their securities in the U.S. capital mar-
kets pursuant to the Securities Act.39 Furthermore, the S.E.C.
created Form 20-F,4" pursuant to the Exchange Act, which
served the purpose of implementing a mandatory periodic
disclosure requirement for private foreign issuers.41 When
originally created, forms F-1 through F-4, F-6, and 20-F were
essentially simplified versions of the forms that the S.E.C. re-
quired U.S. firms to file and reflected subtle differences as a
result of different accounting practices in other countries.
ADRs facilities fall under two different types: sponsored
and unsponsored.43 A sponsored ADR facility is one in which
the issuer actively participates with the depositary (i.e., foreign
branch of U.S. bank) in the issuance of the ADRs." On the
other hand, in an unsponsored ADR facility, the foreign issuer
does not actively participate with the depositary in the issu-
ance of the facility.45 In an unsponsored ADR facility, the de-
positary submits form F-6 to the S.E.C. and is subsequently
authorized to issue ADR's to interested investors while the
foreign issuer in a sponsored ADR facility signs the F-6. 6
Most foreign issuers seek unsponsored facilities while obtain-
ing an exemption to the periodic reporting requirements of the
Exchange Act pursuant to Rule 12g3-2(b)47 rather than regis-
tering its securities under Section 12(g)48 of the Exchange
Act.49 Foreign issuers have relied upon the Rule 12g3-2(b)
exemption but may only trade in the NASD pink sheet mar-
ket-that is, these issuers' securities may not trade on national
35. 17 C.F.R. § 239.32 (1999).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 239.33 (1999).
37. 17 C.F.R. § 239.34 (1999).
38. 17 C.F.R. § 239.36 (1999).
39. See Aulana L. Peters, The International Securities Market: Issues of Regu-
lation and Taxation, 6 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW. 229, 232 (1988).
40. 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f (1999).
41. See Peters, supra note 39, at 232.
42. See id.
43. See Saunders, supra note 33, at 54.
44. See id. at 55-56.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)(1) (1999).
48. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1994).
49. See Saunders, supra note 33, at 55.
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securities exchanges such as the NYSE or NASDAQ."0 More-
over, foreign issuers wishing to tap the U.S. capital market
will typically establish a secondary trading market for their
ADRs, if an active market exists, before proceeding with pri-
mary offerings of ADRs.5" Today, the ADR remains the most
popular vehicle for foreign issuers to access the U.S. capital
markets.52
The year 1989 marked the first significant period of
rulemaking for the S.E.C. as it attempted to attract private
foreign issuers and appease U.S. investors' appetites for for-
eign securities. 3 On April 24, 1990, the S.E.C. introduced
Regulation 54 and Rule 144A.55 The purpose of Regulation S
is to make clear the extraterritorial impact of Section 5 of the
Securities Act upon foreign issuers.5 The purpose of Rule
144A is to provide a safe harbor from Securities Act reporting
requirements involving the resale of securities to qualified
institutional buyers ("QIBs) 57 holding assets totaling at least
$100 million.58 The ultimate effect of these provisions is that
the reporting requirements of foreign private issuers using the
provisions' safe harbors have been reduced when compared to
issuing securities under other provisions of the U.S. securities
laws.59
50. See Roberta S. Karmel & Mary S. Head, Barriers to Foreign Issuer Entry
into U.S. Markets, 24 LAW & POL'Y INTYL BUS. 1207, at 1209 (1993).
51. See Saunders, supra note 33, at 58.
52. See id. at 50.
53. See Roquette, supra note 10, at 584-86.
54. See Securities Act Release No. 6863, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1I 84,524 (Apr. 24, 1990).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1) (1999).
56. See Roberta S. Karmel, SEC Regulation of Multijurisdictional Offerings, 16
BROOK. J. INTL L. 3, 13 (1990).
57. In the parlance of the Securities Act, QIBs are defined differently than an
.accredited investor" pursuant to Regulation D. One legal scholar has criticized the
apparent inconsistency between the definitions. Under Regulation D, an "accredited
investor" can be an institution with $5 million in assets or an individual with
significantly less assets. To qualify as a QIB, an institution must hold $100 mil-
lion in assets. See Lawrence R. Seidman, SEC Rule 144A: The Rule Heard Round
the Globe-Or Sounds of Silence?, 47 Bus. LAw 333, 349 (1991).
58. See Karmel & Head, supra note 50, at 1208-09.
59. See Roquette, supra note 10, at 585.
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C. Alternative Approaches to the Regulation of Private Foreign
Issuers
The last two decades have witnessed alternative methods
of mandatory disclosure schemes which regulators in different
nations, including the U.S., have adopted in order to deal with
the special problems posed by private foreign issuers." There
have been two basic approaches by which regulators have
attempted to reduce the inefficiencies that result from the
traditional national regulatory schemes. These two approaches
are "reciprocity" and "commonality" harmonization, which
encompass the approaches of the European Union, and the
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS) adopted by the
U.S. and Canada in 1991.61
As early as 1980, the European Union (E.U.) had been dis-
cussing the proposal of harmonizing the disclosure rules of
firms offering securities on a transnational basis within its
members' capital markets.62 The policies of the E.U. harmoni-
zation plan were threefold: first, investors were to receive suffi-
cient information from which they could assess the risks of
their investment; second, all investors were to receive equal
access to such information; and third, that the proposed regu-
lations eased the access of foreign issuers to other markets as
a function of treating the European Community as a single
capital market.63 The E.U. approach to the regulation of pri-
vate foreign issuers is accomplished by the operation of "direc-
tives" and regulations which the European Community author-
ity promulgates.'
Harmonization traditionally takes the form of either the
60. See Geiger, supra note 3, at 1788.
61. See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Regis-
tration and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, Securities Act Release No.
6902, [1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $] 84,812, at 81,860 (July 1,
1991) [hereinafter MJDS Release]. Reciprocity implies that an issuer must comply
with its home nation's regulations and the foreign nation's regulations. Commonali-
ty implies that an issuer must comply with a single norm agreed upon by two or
more nations.
62. See generally Proposal for a Council Directive Coordinating the Require-
ments for the Drawing Up, Scrutiny and Distribution of the Prospectus to be Pub-
lished When Securities are Offered for Subscription or Sale to the Public, 1980
O.J. (C 355) 39-40, 46.
63. See Peters, supra note 39, at 232.
64. See Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 17, at 214.
2000] 773
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"reciprocity" or "commonality" models." Reciprocity refers to
the type of harmonization in which regulators of different
nations agree to follow the informational reporting standards
of other nations while commonality is characterized by nations
changing their informational reporting standards to reflect a
universal standard.66 The essence of the E.U. harmonization
plan is that all firms wishing to issue their securities on a
transnational basis have to disclose specific information on a
general form controlled by "mutual recognition" of disclosure
standards.67 Thus,, the E.U. harmonization plan follows the
reciprocity model since each member nation must agree with
the other members that any issuer's offering document will be
accepted in all nations as part of their agreement." While the
SEC has been reluctant to accept the reciprocity approach to
harmonization beyond its MJDS plan with Canada, the ap-
proach is widely accepted throughout much of the world.69
In July of 1991, the S.E.C. adopted the MJDS plan which
marked the first time that the S.E.C. accepted disclosure docu-
ments prepared according to foreign regulations for purposes of
securities offerings in the U.S.v" Pursuant to the MJDS plan,
the U.S. and Canada agreed to accept disclosure documents of
issuers if they satisfy the reporting standards of the issuer's
domestic regulations.7 The S.E.C. announced that the MJDS
plan was the "first step in meeting the needs of transnational
securities transactions."72 While the S.E.C.'s adoption of
MJDS was a "first step" in that it accepted the reciprocal form
of harmonization, the largest single reason explaining the
S.E.C.'s decision is most likely the similarity of the Canadian
and U.S. mandatory disclosure rules.73 Because most nations'
65. Geiger, supra note 3, at 1787.
66. See id. at 1794.
67. Id. at 1790.
68. See id. at 1790-94.
69. See Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 17, at 251.
70. See Richard M. Kosnik, Comments on "Barriers to Foreign Issuer Entry
into U.S. Markets," 24 LAW & POLY INTIL Bus. 1237, 1248-49 (1993). See generally
MJDS Release, supra note 61.
71. See Roquette, supra note 10, at 575.
72. See Multijurisdictional Disclosure, 11989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 84,432, at 80,282 (July 26, 1989).
73. See Roquette, supra note 10, at 577-578 (arguing that unless the S.E.C.
takes the "second step" in extending the concept of MJDS to other nations, the
plan will have a negligible effect upon addressing market internationalization).
774 [Vol. =XI2
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disclosure rules are significantly different from those of the
United States, it is not likely that the S.E.C. will extend the
MJDS plan to other countries in the near future. 4
D. Current Trends in the Law Affecting Private Foreign
Issuers
Perhaps the most important development addressing the
special problems raised by transnational securities offering is
that of the emergence of the Inter American Association of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Several nations in the West-
ern Hemisphere founded IOSCO in 1974 for the purposes of
providing a forum for regulators of member nations to discuss
securities issues and to assist capital formation primarily in
the Western Hemisphere.7' The S.E.C. is a member of IOSCO
and serves as a member of IOSCO's Technical Committee
which reviews "major regulatory issues related to international
securities. . . transactions and to coordinate practical respons-
es to these concerns."76
In 1987, the IOSCO Technical Committee initiated a study
which addressed methods and emergent issues related to the
increased levels of transnational securities offerings. As a
result of this study, IOSCO recommended in a report entitled
"International Equity Offers" that "regulators [should] be en-
couraged . . . to facilitate the use of single disclosure docu-
ments, whether by harmonization of standards, reciprocity or
otherwise."78 However, regulators had accomplished little in
line with IOSCO's recommendation largely by reason of differ-
ing accounting practices among member nations. 9 It was not
until 1995 that IOSCO and the International Accounting Stan-
dards Committee (IASC), a body not part of IOSCO, reached
an agreement with respect to accounting practices to be ap-
plied to the new standards among member nations.8 " The
S.E.C., although applauding the efforts of IOSCO and the
IASC, reserved its acceptance of international accounting stan-
74. See Demmo, supra note 4, at 706.
75. See Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 17, at 238.
76. International Disclosure Proposals, supra note 8, at 4.
77. See Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 17, at 238.
78. International Disclosure Proposals, supra note 8, at 4.
79. See Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 17, at 242.
80. See id. at 243.
20001 775
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dards upon their "generally accepted basis of accounting ...
[which] would result in compatibility and transparency, pro-
vide full disclosure, and [be] rigorously interpreted and ap-
plied."52
On February 2, 1999, the S.E.C. proposed to "revise [its]
disclosure standards for foreign private issuers to incorporate
the international disclosure standards in their entirety."82 The
S.E.C. concluded that investor protection would not be jeopar-
dized by incorporating the new international disclosure stan-
dards since it did not perceive a "change in the quality of dis-
closure that investors [would] receive."" Acceptance of the
new IOSCO disclosure standards would require the S.E.C. to:
amend Forms 20-F;8 4  F-i; 8' F-2;86  F-3;"7  F-4;"8  revise
Regulation S-X; 9 and change the definition of a "foreign pri-
vate issuer" under both the Securities Act and Exchange
ActY0
Then, on September 28, 1999, the S.E.C. announced that
the proposed rules changes it announced on February 2, 1999
would become effective on September 30, 2000.91 While the
S.E.C. encountered little objection to the adoption of the
IOSCO standards,92 the primary advantages and disadvantag-
81. See A. A. Sommer, Jr., IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement, 17 NW. J.
INT'L L. & BuS. 15, 25 & n.46 (1996).
82. International Disclosure Proposals, supra note 8, at 7.
83. Id. IOSCO developed and recommended the following ten "core" disclosure
items for cross-border offerings: (1) identity of directors and senior management;
(2) offering statistics and timetable; (3) essential financial data, reasons for offer-
ing, anticipated use of proceeds from offering, information regarding risk factors;
(4) information about the issuer's business and properties; (5) management discus-
sion of financial condition and operating results of issuer; (6) compensation and
equity holdings of issuer's employees; (7) majority shareholders and related party
transactions; (8) presentation of financial statements and contingent liabilities; (9)
description of offering and listing;, and (10) other relevant information. Id. at 5.
84. 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f (1999).
85. 17 C.F.R. § 239.31 (1999).
86. 17 C.F.R. § 239.32 (1999).
87. 17 C.F.R. § 239.33 (1999).
88. 17 C.F.R. § 239.34 (1999).
89. 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-19 (1999).
90. See generally International Disclosure Proposals, supra note 8. "Foreign
private issuer" is defined in the Securities Act under 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1997)
and in the Exchange Act under 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4 (1997).
91. See Final Rule: International Disclosure Standards, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-41936 (Sept. 28, 1999); Securities Act Release No. 33-7745 (Sept. 28, 1999),
both available in 1999 WL 770251 (S.E.C.) [hereinafter Final Ruling].
92. Id. at 3. "All of the comment letters expressed support for increasing in-
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es of the harmonization effort in light of increased internation-
alization of securities markets are clear. A primary advantage
of the adopted rule changes is that implied within them is a
signal of the S.E.C.'s willingness to work with the commonality
model of harmonization.93 However, the rule changes incorpo-
rate the commonality approach to harmonization only to the
extent of adopting common accounting standards for multina-
tional offerings while each nation retains its own minimum
standards of disclosure for domestic offerings.94 A primary
disadvantage of the S.E.C's adoption of the IOSCO standards
is that IOSCO's power is limited by its "inability to impose its
mandates and the diversity among [IOSCO's] members which.
. . leads to disagreements concerning standards."95 Therefore,
much of IOSCO's success might be measured by the S.E.C.'s
willingness to remain flexible and follow the lead of IOSCO's
mandates in the future.
Clearly, the S.E.C.'s choice of adopting the IOSCO com-
monality approach of harmonizing mandatory disclosure at the
international level was the optimal choice for the S.E.C. since
the advantages of commonality outweigh the advantages of
reciprocity.96 The commonality approach make possible the
realization of economies of scale since practitioners, investors,
and issuers only will have to learn and use a single set of rules
as opposed to multiple sets under the reciprocity approach.97
Moreover, a single common prospectus will make possible more
ternational harmonization of disclosure standards and many expressed support for
the proposed amendments . . . " Id.
93. See Geiger, supra note 3, at 1796-97.
94. See id. at 1797. Geiger argues that the commonality approach to harmo-
nization should be extended to its logical conclusion. That is, there should be a
formation of a global prospectus and global coordinator to facilitate international
harmonization. The S.E.C.'s rule changes incorporate both commonality and reci-
procity approaches in that IOSCO accounting standards follow commonality, but in
the end, the changes still follow the reciprocity approach since foreign private
issuers must satisfy minimum U.S. reporting standards contained in Form 20-F.
Geiger's argument with respect to the benefits of creating an ultimate global regu-
lator is beyond the scope of this Note. Rather, this Note focuses on what informa-
tion should be disclosed, not upon who should be overseeing the mandatory dis-
closure requirements.
95. Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 17, at 266.
96. See generally Uri Geiger, The Case for the Harmonization of Securities
Disclosure Rules in the Global Market, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 241, 297-317
(using various economic arguments to justify his conclusion).
97. See Geiger, supra note 3, at 1796.
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efficient comparison of alternative investments from different
markets." Unfortunately, the IOSCO standards merely ac-
commodate differing accounting regimes across nations. These
standards still fail to address what type of information is im-
portant to investors and, thus, private foreign issuers will
continue to incur costs that exceed the benefits of IOSCO
changes.
III. ECONOMIC DECONSTRUCTION OF THE IOSCO/S.E.C.
PROPOSAL
While the S.E.C.'s recent change in policy impacting for-
eign private issuers is likely to be the most appropriate method
to address increasing internationalization of the securities
markets, economic information theory suggests that its effort
falls short. The relevant issue has long been not whether the
S.E.C. should engage in such regulatory reform, but rather the
appropriate depth and nature of that reform.99 Efficient Mar-
kets Hypothesis 0 ' (EMH) and Modern Portfolio Theory'
(MPT) imply that the S.E.C. should focus disclosure rules of
foreign private issuers primarily upon the dissemination of
market risk factors in order to achieve the goals of maintaining
the hegemony of the U.S. equity markets, protecting investors,
decreasing the cost of capital to foreign issuers, and facilitating
the cross-border flows of capital.' Moreover, modern eco-
nomic theories such as chaos theory'0 ' and noise theory 4
98. Id.
99. See generally Paul G. Mahoney, Technology, Property Rights in Informa-
tion, and Securities Regulation, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 815, 843-45 (1998).
100. See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. OF FINANCE 383 (1970). EMH, in general, holds
that securities prices reflect publicly available information. Id.
101. See generally Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. OF FINANCE 77
(1952). MPT holds that investors may eliminate almost all of the firm specific risk
of assets held in their portfolios by the addition of less than perfectly correlated
assets to their portfolios. Id. See also generally HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO
SELECTION: EFFICIENT DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (1959).
102. See generally Palmiter, supra note 19. Palmiter recommends that the
S.E.C. give issuers the alternative of "opting out" of the disclosure rules. The main
thrust of this piece is that investors and issuers may reach a more effective mid-
point wherein the issuer discloses an "ex-post" beta plus additional relevant mar-
ket risk factors that are not easily quantified. While this piece argues that these
recommended disclosures should be exempt from the fraud provisions of U.S. law,
disclosures with respect to firm-specific information would remain under the fraud
provisions. Id.
103. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic
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can serve to augment the thesis advanced in this Note. 10 5
While legal and economic scholars have previously advanced
the argument that EMH and MPT explain away the need for
mandatory disclosure, this Note argues that these theories
better explain what information foreign private issuers should
disclose to assist investors when making their transactional
decisions.
A. The Economics of Information
The notion of EMH posits that the price of a given stock
reflects all available information.' 6 What "all information"
means turns on upon whether one refers to either the "weak-
form," "semistrong-form," or "strong-form" of EMH.' °7 Weak-
form EMH implies that a stock's price reflects such informa-
tion as the history of past prices, short interest, and trading
volume.' 8 Semistrong-form EMH proposes that a stock's
price reflects all publicly available information. 9 Finally,
strong-form EMH proposes that a stock's price reflects all in-
formation about the firm; even information only available to
Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994). For the seminal works which introduced chaos theory
to the fields of economics and finance, see generally JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAK-
ING A NEW SCIENCE (1988); J. Doyne Farmer & John J. Sidorowich, Can New Ap-
proaches to Nonlinear Modeling Improve Economic Forecasts?, in THE ECONOMY AS
AN EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEM 99 (Philip W. Anderson et al. eds., 1988). These
seminal works present chaos theory as follows: small changes in initial conditions
may produce significant changes in the future.
104. For the seminal work on "noise theory," see Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. OF
FINANCE 529 (1986). See also Stephen F. LeRoy, Efficient Capital Markets and
Martingales, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1583, 1611-12 (1989). Noise theory, in essence, holds
that some investors in the capital markets make trading decisions on the basis
that they are able to "outwit" other investors. Id.
105. While economic and legal scholars generally deploy the chaos theory to
deconstruct EMH, it seems that the theory better explains "chaotic" stock market
events such as the October 1987 crash, as opposed to outright disproving EMH.
Noise theory tends to directly support this Note's argument.
106. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 33, at 340. The EMH is an outgrowth of
work done by the French mathematician Louis Bachelier in which he elaborated
on a 1900 model which explained that prices of certain assets on the French
Bourse over time behaved in a random manner (ergo, "random walk"). See Louis
Bacheleir, Theory of Speculation, in THE RANDOM CHARACTER OF STOCK MARKET
PRICE 17 (Paul H. Cootner ed., rev. ed. 1964).
107. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 33, at 341.
108. See id.
109. See id.
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insiders."' Neither financial economists nor legal scholars
give much weight to strong-form EMH, but generally agree
that markets are very efficient."'
Harry M. Markowitz's development of MPT in 1952 "2
dramatically changed the way in which investors viewed the
concepts of risk and return."' One of the important princi-
ples derived from MPT is that a stock's risk is composed of two
components."' Each firm's risk profile is composed of "unique
risk," or alpha, which relates solely to how the firm's stock
reacts to factors internal to the firm and "market risk," or beta,
which relates to how the firm's stock reacts to market varia-
tion." '5 MPT holds that from a starting point of a single as-
set, as investors add assets to their portfolios at random, aver-
age portfolio risk drops appreciably."6 Alternatively, so long
as investors can continue to add less than perfectly correlated
stocks to their portfolios, they can continually reduce the
unique risk component of each individual stock contained in
their portfolios." 7 Since investors may diversify away unique
risk, competitive stock markets should not reward investors for
taking on such risk.1'8 Therefore, the ultimate implication of
MPT is that a diversified investor need only be concerned with
how his or her portfolio reacts with movements in the under-
lying market as measured by portfolio beta."' In other
words, diversified investors should be indifferent to the unique
110. See id.
111. See id. at 377 (concluding that while markets are very efficient, informa-
tional based rewards are available to those who are extremely diligent, smart and
creative). Id.
112. Supra note 92 and accompanying text.
113. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 155-56 (4th ed. 1991).
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. See BODIE ET-AL., supra note 33, at 194.
117. See id. at 197. The primary lesson of diversification is that investors may
actually achieve higher expected returns for less overall risk since unique risk is
virtually eliminated. Id. This is achieved because expected portfolio return is a
function of the weighted average of each stock's expected return while portfolio
volatility (standard deviation) is less than the weighted average of each stock's
standard deviation. Id.
118. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 113, at 129-140.
119. See id. at 143. Beta forms the critical slope element of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model (CAPM). Id. at 161. CAPM holds that the expected rate of return
on a stock is equal to the risk-free rate of return plus the product beta multiplied
by the market risk premium; i.e., E(r) = rf P3E(r.) - rjl.
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risk of the individual stocks contained in their portfolios.
As a result of the market crash that occurred on October
19, 1987, in which the Dow Jones Industrial Average plummet-
ed 23 percent, EMH and its logical outgrowth, MPT, have been
called into question by behavioral scientists and econo-
mists. 12 Behavioral scientists and economists have attacked
EMH and MPT with noise theory; which basically holds that
some investors buy and sell stocks, thus affecting prices, based
on irrational decisions as opposed to fundamental values.
121
Furthermore, noise theory makes a distinction between "infor-
mational" and "fundamental" values of assets which reflects
the import of its rationale. 22 The theory is best explained
with the following illustration: investors may buy or sell based
merely upon what other investors do, which is an information-
al dimension of value, yet the prices paid for assets may not
reflect their fundamental or intrinsic value.123 Therefore,
noise theory suggests that markets may be efficient in incorpo-
rating all publicly available information under the semi-strong
form of EMH, but that prices of some assets may not be based
on rational fundamental values.124
Chaos theory is a relatively modern economics of informa-
tion theory which directly challenges the assumptions of EMH
in light of EMH's purported inability to explain market crash-
es." Simplified, chaos theory holds that minute changes in
original conditions can portend large changes in ultimate out-
comes.12' Alternatively, EMH rests upon the assumption that
changes in stock prices are purely random whereas chaos theo-
120. Id. at 297-300. However, Brealey and Myers point out that "Black Mon-
day" did not necessarily disprove EMH, but that the crash merely reinforced the
notion that EMH explains relative values of stock prices while EMH's ability to
prove the intrinsic value of a security is often labored. Id. The reader should be
aware of the fact that the precipitous decline in stock values was not limited to
the 30 stocks that make up the DJIA or U.S. stock on a whole; the crash of Octo-
ber 1987 was a world-wide phenomena. See generally PETER S. ROSE, MONEY AND
CAPITAL MARKETS 536-37 (5th ed. 1994).
121. See Cunningham, supra note 103, at 565-66.
122. Id. at 563.
123. See id. at 564. Fundamental value of an asset is equal to the net present
value of all expected future cash flows. Id.
124. See id. at 563.
125. See id at 593-98.
126. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 641, 642 (1996). See generally GLEICK, supra note 103.
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ry holds that changes in stock prices "thought to be... ran-
dom are not random but exhibit significant pattern."'27 While
there is presently no conclusive proof that capital markets
follow chaotic behavior, legal scholars and financial economists
have opined otherwise." Given a brief description of the var-
ious economic models that legal and economic scholars have
brought to bear upon the issue of mandatory disclosure, this
Note turns to how these models have influenced the S.E.C. in
their policy making decisions.
B. Implications of Economics of Information upon Mandatory
Disclosure
The EMH and MPT theories have been used to critique
the adequacy of the S.E.C.'s corporate disclosure system since
the early 1960's.129 Moreover, EMH and MPT have had a sig-
nificant influence upon the policy making of the S.E.C. with re-
spect to mandatory disclosure issues since the late 1960's. 3 '
On the other hand, the noise and chaos theories are relatively
new in the legal community as bearing on the topic of manda-
tory disclosure and are being marshaled to critique the EMH's
position as the fundamental model from which policy makers
base their disclosure policies.' The purpose of this section is
to delineate how EMH and MPT have affected the various
policies of the S.E.C., and to address how these theories cast
doubt on the necessity of mandatory disclosure.
EMH "has served as the intellectual premise for... major
revision[s] of the disclosure system administered by the
[S.E.C.] . ... ,2 The S.E.C. expressly invoked EMH in its
adoption of integrated disclosure"3 and "shelf regulation"
127. Cunningham, supra note 103, at 582. Chaos theory implies that the linear
model of EMH is deficient since the behavior of markets is multi-dimensional or
perhaps even deterministic. Id.
128. See id. at 594. For an excellent perspective of chaos theory in capital
markets from leading financial economists, see generally WILLIAM A. BROCK ET
AL., NONLINEAR DYNAMICS, CHAOS, AND INSTABILITY: STATISTICAL THEORY AND
ECONOMIC EVIDENCE (1991).
129. See SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 196-97.
130. See HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION
IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 83-93 (1979).
131. See Cunningham, supra note 103, at 608.
132. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 550 (1984).
133. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No.
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pursuant to Rule 4153 of the Securities Act. Moreover, the
Supreme Court's adoption of EMH to support its "fraud-on-the-
market" theory in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,'35 to satisfy the reli-
ance element in certain securities-fraud cases, served to illus-
trate the influence EMH has had on the legal community.136
While it appears that the S.E.C. and the courts have taken an
incremental approach in adapting regulations to the implica-
tions of the EMH, the argument has been made that EMH's
implications be extended to their logical conclusion.
Since the early 1960's, economic and legal scholars have
brought EMH to bear on the question of whether mandatory
disclosure is worth the costs it imposes on firms.137 Oppo-
nents of mandatory disclosure have advanced the following
argument: if market professionals acting as arbitrageurs com-
pete for purchasing and selling opportunities by obtaining
valuable information upon which to base their transactional
decisions, securities will be appropriately priced by operation of
such arbitrage activity and, therefore, "the core of the SEC's
regime of regulatory mandate, is simply unnecessary."'38 On
the other hand, proponents of the S.E.C.'s mandatory disclo-
sure regime suggest that it might be necessary to protect a
6383 [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,328 (Mar. 3, 1982).
When an issuer that is subject to the disclosure requirements of the Exchange
Act, it may incorporate certain disclosure forms when issuing pursuant to the
Securities Act. Id. See also COX ET AL., supra, note 21, at 245-63 (2d ed. 1997).
134. Rule 415, Securities Act Release No. 6499 [1982-1983 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 83,449 (Dec. 31, 1983). Shelf regulation allows certain
issuers with equity outstanding in a trading market to register additional securi-
ties of the same class with minimal disclosure. See COX ET AL., supra note 21, at
268-70.
135. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). A majority of the Court accepted the notion that in
efficient markets, if there is fraud, the cost of such fraud should be reflected in
the price of the security in question. Thus, relying on price, is in essence justifi-
ably relying on the fraud. Id. at 245-50.
136. See Cunningham, supra note 103, at 548.
137. See SELIGMAN, supra note 23, at 195. While the critique of the S.E.C.'s
mandatory disclosure system began in the early 1960's, the S.E.C. did not even
venture to repudiate the various critiques based upon the EMH theory until 1977.
Id. As suggested in this Note, the S.E.C. eventually withdrew much of its repudia-
tion. For the primary arguments that mandatory disclosure is obsolete, see gener-
ally George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973); George J.
Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. BUs. 117 (1964).
138. Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 909, 927-28
(1994).
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group of irrational market participants known as "noise trad-
ers."139 However, just because investors choose to participate
in trading markets on an uninformed basis is not necessarily
an irrational act since the costs of relying on market
professionals' role as price makers might be less than the op-
portunity costs of self-education. "' Moreover, if it is assumed
that noise traders are truly irrational in their decisions be-
cause they do not act on fundamental information, such rea-
soning also supports the conclusion that mandatory disclosure
is "irrelevant." Therefore, while noise theory addresses the
topic of mandatory disclosure from a different angle, it may be
employed to arrive at the same conclusion as does EMH.
Additionally, proponents of mandatory disclosure also raise
chaos theory to counter the assumptions of EMH and its con-
clusion that mandatory disclosure is unnecessary.' Chaos
theory advocates that the "linear frame of reference" which
EMH rests upon is insufficient to explain market behavior.'
Moreover, chaos theory criticizes EMH's simplistic information-
al approach by suggesting that other factors such as firm fun-
damentals, macroeconomic factors, and differentiated time
dimensions affect prices of securities.' Because EMH does
139. Id. at 929. "The possibility that human beings behave irrationally has
been resisted by economists for centuries, and is 'assumed out' of ECMH model."
Cunningham, supra note 103, at 565. Cunningham points out that economists, to
save face, interchanged the term "irrational" with "noise." See id.
140. See Macey, supra note 138, at 930-31. One may advance the argument
that it is not the responsibility of the S.E.C. to protect individuals who opt to act
irrationally in the first place, assuming that noise traders are indeed irrational.
141. Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 881 (1992). Langevoort ad-
vances the argument that much of the revision the S.E.C. has adopted in view of
the positive norm of EMH can be justified independently of that economic theory.
See generally id.
142. See generally Cunningham, supra note 103.
143. See id. at 603. Chaos theory attacks EMH as being a linear or two-dimen-
sional model, while chaos theory is a multi-dimensional model which explains
various behaviors beyond the financial markets..
144. See id. Multi-factor models which attempt to explain market behavior are
not the exclusive domain of chaos theory. Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) is argu-
ably an earlier attempt to introduce the notion that various factors such as indus-
trial activity, short and long-term inflation and interest rates, interest rate
spreads, and default risk have some affect on price. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra
note 113, at 169-73. For a discussion of the implications of APT, see generally
Steven A. Ross, The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing, 35 J. OF ECON.
THEORY 341 (1976). The difficulty in applying APT, however, lies in deciding what
factors to include in the model from which to derive an expected return on any
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not incorporate the factors which chaos theory recognizes,
chaos theory "implies a possible justification for expanded
disclosure of information concerning price discovery in the
market microstructure."'45 However, as its name implies, eco-
nonic and legal scholars predominately employ chaos theory
only to explain chaotic events-typically, stock market crashes
such as the one that occurred in October 1987.146 The chaos
theory has an intuitive appeal as an explanatory model, yet its
weakness lies in its inability to explain overall market behav-
ior. This Note does not suggest, however, that the model be
discounted as having no value as the basis of a positive norm.
Therefore, this model should remain as one of the guiding
factors for the development of S.E.C. policy.14
It is obvious that the S.E.C. is nowhere near the point at
which it will accept the argument that mandatory disclosure is
irrelevant." Various arguments have been advanced for the
S.E.C.'s reluctance to introduce radical change to the structure
of the Securities Act and Exchange Act. For example, the
S.E.C. has been accused of extending its regulatory reach and
manufacturing crises for purposes of maintaining its rele-
vance." 9 Alternatively, the S.E.C. must become "less . . . at-
given asset. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 113, at 171.
145. Cunningham, supra note 103, at 604.
146. See generally id. See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, Capital Market
Theory, Mandatory Disclosure, and Price Discovery, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 843
(1994). An additional disadvantage of chaos theory seems to be its intellectual
appeal to the legal community. Unfortunately, legal scholars give short shrift to
many of the other explanatory theories of market crashes. For example, one popu-
lar theory posits that the October 1987 market crash was largely a result of pro-
fessional investment managers employing portfolio insurance strategies which cre-
ated a prime condition for a "cascade" downward of securities prices. See G.J.
Santoni, The October Crash: Some Evidence on the Cascade Theory, in THE FINAN-
CIAL DERIVATIVES READER 461, 463-67 (Robert W. Kolb ed., 1992).
147. As a general observation, chaos theory appears to be a favored topic in
the legal scholarly literature but does not yet appear to have been accepted as a
policy tool of the S.E.C. .
148. For example, the S.E.C.'s insistence on protecting investors by demanding
disclosure of information is reflected in the following S.E.C. policy statement:
The Commission historically has sought to balance the informational needs of
investors with our awareness that the interest of the public is served by opportu-
nities to invest in a variety of securities . . . In our 1988 policy statement, we
noted that '[tihe goal in addressing international disclosure and registration prob-
lems should be to minimize regulatory impediments without compromising investor
protection.' International Disclosure Proposals, supra note 8, at 3 (emphasis added).
149. See Macey, supra note 138, at 936-37.
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tached to some of the sacred cows of the United States disclo-
sure system and recognize the merits of different regulatory
approaches."5 ' On the other hand, if the S.E.C. were to com-
promise its reporting standards for the sake of foreign private
issuers, its position with respect to domestic reporting require-
ments would come under political regulatory arbitrage pres-
sure, thus creating an environment ripe for a regulatory race
to the bottom.1"' Yet, the purpose of this Note is not neces-
sarily to advance the obsolescence of mandatory disclosure
argument, but merely to advance the proposition that EMH
supports the conclusion that the S.E.C. should have adopted a
"less is more" strategy when formulating its recent revisions to
the reporting requirement of foreign private issuers.'52
As introduced above, the key lesson of MPT is that the
risk inherent in owning a basket of securities is market risk
since firm specific risk may be eliminated through the process
of diversification.' Therefore, there should be less demand
for mandatory disclosure' since it focuses on firm-specific
risk and does not adequately explain how a given security
reacts to "overall market" factors. 5 Consequently, MPT sug-
gests that the S.E.C. should concentrate on requiring issuers to
disclose market factors that might have an effect upon the
price of the securities they offer to investors. The following
question then logically follows: what factors are material to an
investor making the transactional decision with respect to
market risk?
There are a number of factors, both ex-ante and ex-post,
that an investor should use in deciding whether to make any
150. Karmel, supra note 56, at 17.
151. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Con-
vergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641,
697 (1999).
152. Perhaps the strongest argument for maintaining the current disclosure
regime with its attendant focus on historical information is that history serves as
an imperfect proxy for the future. That is, "facts of the existing situation enter, in
a sense disproportionately, into the formations of our long-term expectations; our
usual practice being to take the existing situation and to project it into the future
. " See JONATHAN M. KEYNES, GENERAL THEORY 148 (1936). It seems that
Keynes suggested that forward looking information is what is truly relevant, but
without some sense of the past, expectations might converge on the irrational.
153. See discussion, supra part III.A.
154. See id.
155. KRIPKE, supra note 130, at 92.
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given security investment. The first and primary market risk
factor an investor should be concerned with is a specific
investment's beta (M.'56 P is critical to the investment deci-
sion since "[tihe risk of a well-diversified portfolio depends on
the market risk of the securities included in the portfolio."157
Because evidence suggests that the historical returns of the
U.S. and foreign security markets are not directly correlat-
ed, "'58 additions of foreign securities to a domestic portfolio
increase the reward-to-volatility ratio to investors.'59 There-
fore, foreign firms wishing to issue their securities in the U.S.
should be required to report their firm's 0 (as derived against
some U.S. market proxy such as the Standard & Poor's 500)
and their domestic market's correlation of annual returns with
that of the U.S. market proxy. 6 ' While P and correlation co-
efficients would serve as useful ex-ante disclosure, the S.E.C.
should require firms to disclose certain forward looking infor-
mation which could be treated in a similar fashion as other
"soft-information" disclosures within the Exchange Act's fraud
rules. 6'
Since international investing lends itself to multi-dimen-
sional models of deriving securities returns such as the Arbi-
trage Pricing Theory'62 (APT),6' the S.E.C. should mandate
that foreign firms issuing securities in the U.S. market release
information with respect to various forward looking factors
which might affect the price of those securities. For example,
156. See discussion supra, part III.A.
157. BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 113, at 143. Critics of the argument pre-
sented in this piece may note that beta is important only if one assumes that all
investors are well diversified. The counter to this argument is that even though
not all investors are well diversified, the market still only compensates them for
non-diversifiable risk. See generally William A- Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A
Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 (1964).
158. See GIDDY, supra note 31, at 428.
159. See BODIE ET AL., supra note 33, at 833.
160. Such information could easily be tested against the fraud provisions of the
securities laws since both beta and correlation coefficients are derived from ex-ante
return data.
161. For example, Palmiter suggests that 10b-5 liability under the Exchange
Act is both a flexible doctrine and sufficient rule to ensure adequate disclosure in
most circumstances. See Palmiter, supra note 19, at 130-31. Rule lOb-5 provides
the cause of action for fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity in the secondary market. See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1999).
162. See supra note 144.
163. See GIDDY, supra note 31, at 427.
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foreign firms should be required to release forward looking
information such as anticipated levels of industrial activity,
anticipated changes in inflation, anticipated short and long-
term interest rate spreads, and anticipated default risk
spreads between low and high-risk corporate bonds.1"
Finally, the justification for such disclosure as recommend-
ed above rests upon the premise that the addition of interna-
tional assets into a diversified portfolio is a rational risk reduc-
ing decision.165 As the discussion above illustrates, detailed
firm-specific information is not necessary to investors when
making the decision to reduce risk while at the same time
maximizing return. Therefore, if the marginal costs to interna-
tional issuers in meeting mandatory disclosure requirements
exceed the benefits of reaching into the foreign market, the
S.E.C.'s goals of protecting the interests of investors and facili-
tating the notion of freely mobile capital will not be realized.
C. Economic Theories Applied to Amended Form 20-F
On September 28, 1999, the S.E.C. announced as a final
rule that it was "revising the registration statements used by
foreign private issuers under the Securities Act of 1933 to
reflect the changes in Form 20-F."166 The S.E.C.'s final ruling
with respect to the new international disclosure rules provides
that "[a]ny foreign private issuer" may use Form 20-F as a
registration statement under the Exchange Act.167 Amended
Form 20-F requires a foreign private issuer opting to use it for
mandatory disclosure requirements to report numerous "items"
or "standards."168 This part of the analysis will address the
164. See N-F. Chen et. al, Economic Forces and the Stock Market, 59 J. OF
BUS. 383, 383-403 (1986).
165. See GIDDY, supra note 31, at 446. The implication of this premise is clear:
if the S.E.C. truly wishes to protect investors (which includes facilitating the abili-
ty to maximize return while minimizing risk) and facilitate cross-border flows of
capital, it should construct rules which assist investors and issuers rather than
unnecessarily adding costs.
166. See Final Ruling, supra note 91, at 1.
167. Id. at 26. The Final Ruling also amended 17 CFR § 230.405 which now
provides that a "foreign private issuer" is any issuer other than: (1) an issuer with
greater that 50% of its voting shares held by U.S. investors; (2) an issuer with a
majority of officers or directors who are U.S. citizens; (3) an issuer maintaining
over 50% of its assets in the U.S.; and (4) an issuer predominantly doing business
within the U.S. Id. at 19-20.
168. See generally id.
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core items which deal with what foreign private issuers must
or should disclose. This part also provides the foundation of
this Note's contention that while the S.E.C. should be applaud-
ed for accepting IOSCO standards, modern economic theory
suggests that the S.E.C.'s rule making falls short of realizing
the opportunity of truly achieving the goals of protecting in-
vestors, decreasing the cost of capital to foreign issuers, and fa-
cilitating the cross-border flows of capital. The rule making
falls short simply because the S.E.C. has once again failed to
sufficiently address what information is important to investors.
The first Item (Item 1) required on revised Form 20-F is
the identification of company directors, senior management,
and other persons related to the firm's registration of list-
ing."9 As suggested by EMH,"7° a security's price should al-
ready reflect this basic historical information, and therefore,
requiring foreign private issuers to disclose such information
does not necessarily protect investors but increases the firm's
cost of raising capital. Item 2 on revised Form 20-F requires
the foreign private issuer to report "key information regarding
the conduct of any offering and the identification of important
dates relating to [the] offering." 7' While EMH would suggest
this information may not be necessary, if in fact the foreign
private issuer is filing a registration statement pursuant to the
Securities Act, information such as "[t]he time period during
which the offer will be open . . . " is obviously indispensable
with respect to whether an investor can even enter into a
transactional decision. 72
The purpose of Item 3 is "to summarize key information
about the company's financial condition, capitalization and risk
factors."173 The "key" information required under this stan-
dard generally includes five years of income statements, bal-
ance sheet items, and statements of capitalization and debt
levels. 174 While some legal and economic scholars have ar-
169. See id. at 30-31.
170. See Parts III.A & B, supra.
171. See Final Ruling, supra note 91, at 31. If the foreign direct issuer is filing
a registration under the Exchange Act, then it does not have to report Item 2. On
the other hand, if the foreign issuer is filing a registration statement under the
Securities Act, then the information is required. See id.
172. Id. at 31.
173. Id. at 32.
174. See id.
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gued that such firm specific information is exactly what EMH
explains away,' o history is often the best proxy for the for-
mation of expectations, 7 ' and thus, this information should
be required of foreign issuers. Item 3 should serve as the cen-
terpiece of Form 20-F since many of its other provisions merely
repeat the information it generates. 77 Moreover, investors
may use much of the information in Item 3 as a proxy for com-
paring their expectations with the firm's management with
respect to forward looking market risk factors required in Item
5.178
The purpose of Item 5 of the new Form 20-F is to provide
"management's explanation of factors that have affected the
company's financial condition ... and ... assessment of factors
and trends which are anticipated to have a material affect on
the company's financial condition." 79 The key risk factors in-
cluded in Item 5 include inflation, foreign currency fluctua-
tions, and political risk.8 ° Requiring firms to disclosure such
factors would serve as a basis from which private and institu-
tional investors could make comparison as to their own future
expectations. These investors could compare their expectations
with the firm's management drawn not only from historical
information disclosed under Item 5 but also from
management's forward-looking projections.'' Thus, Item 5
serves a material function for investors since it provides them
with valuable information from which to make a rational
transactional decision.
Items 6 and 7 of Form F-20 deal with firm-specific infor-
mation since they address corporate governance issues. 8 '
MPT posits that investors are not rewarded for taking on risk
175. See Parts III.A & B, supra.
176. See KEYNES, supra note 152 and accompanying text.
177. See generally Final Ruling, supra note 91.
178. See Final Ruling, supra note 91, at 37-40.
179. Id. at 38.
180. See id.
181. Instructions to Item 5 provides that management "should" supply forward-
looking information, but that it is not required. Id. at 39. Whether the S.E.C.
'should" require firms to provide forward-looking information is reserved for Part
V, infra.
182. Item 6 requires disclosure of information with respect to directors, execu-
tive management and employees. See Final Ruling, supra note 91, at 40. Item 7
requires disclosure of major shareholders and firm transactions with such affiliates.
See id. at 41.
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with respect to management and majority shareholder conduct
(i.e., firm-specific risk). MPT further implies that such disclo-
sures could only be of marginal value to a diversified inves-
tor'83 since portfolio risk is a function of multiple securities
and their correlations."' Moreover, one could argue that the
corporate law doctrines of the "business judgment rule"18 5
and various director and majority shareholder duty rules pro-
vide investors with a sufficient insurance contract protecting
against firm-specific risk. Because the marginal cost of requir-
ing foreign private issuers to report information with respect to
their management structure and purported interested transac-
tions likely exceeds the risk reducing benefits conferred upon
shareholders, the S.E.C. has failed in its goals by insisting on
disclosure of these Items.
Moreover, Item 10 requires the disclosure of statutory
information which does not necessarily relate to market risk
factors for which the financial markets would reward an inves-
tor. Item 10 requires the reporting of such information as fol-
lows: (1) share capital reflected on the balance sheet; (2) the
firm's corporate charter; (3) material contracts outside the
normal course of business; (4) governmental currency exchange
controls; (5) tax regime; and (6) dividend restrictions.'86 EMH
and MPT might suggest that requiring disclosure of the firm's
corporate charter and material contracts outside the normal
course of business are irrelevant with respect to investors'
expected returns since the market only rewards a given inves-
tor for taking on market risk. On the other hand, future gov-
ernment exchange controls and tax regimes probably have an
effect on market pricing of assets. Additionally, it is reasonable
to require disclosure of dividend restrictions since rational
investors require some information on dividends from which to
build expectations of future dividend cash flows to incorporate
into an asset valuation model."8 7
Item 12 addresses a foreign private issuer's disclosure
183. This argument does not fail in its assumption that all investors are well
diversified since the market, in theory, only rewards investors for market risk.
Hence, it should be of no moment whether an investor is well diversified or not.
184. See Parts III.A & B, supra.
185. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, at 872 (Del. 1985).
186. See Final Ruling, supra note 91, at 51-53.
187. See GARY SMITH, FINANCIAL ASSETS, MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 257-59
(1993).
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obligations when "registering debt securities" or ADRs."8'
Item 13 addresses information about unpaid dividends and
default."9 All of the disclosure with respect to these items
contains ex-ante data and is essentially irrelevant, as suggest-
ed by MPT. However, critics of MPT point out that investors
require firm-specific data when any issuer offers securities in a
primary offering because management has an incentive to not
fully disclose unfavorable information.' Yet, in the current
intermediated securities markets and given an underwriters'
reputation concern, before a foreign issuer's securities have hit
the market, management has had sufficient incentive to dis-
close such unfavorable information well in advance of any
offering.'9 ' Thus, the S.E.C. in requiring the disclosure of infor-
mation under Items 12 and 13 has imposed a double cost upon
the issuer. There is little doubt that such costs outweigh any
presumed benefit considering the fact that intermediaries have
already priced such information into the foreign private
issuer's securities.
Upon an analysis of the S.E.C.'s Final Ruling on amending
Form 20-F, it appears that the S.E.C. has missed the opportu-
nity to address the reality that a significant portion of the
disclosure required might be marginally important to investors
as suggested by the economics of information. Furthermore,
the S.E.C. has turned a blind eye to the fact that much of the
disclosure required of issuers is otherwise previously disclosed
under normal market pressures brought to bear by institution-
al investors and investment professionals.192 Although the
great bulk of scholarship on the benefits and costs of mandato-
ry disclosure continues to argue against the "paternalistic
tendencies"93 of the S.E.C., whether the S.E.C. will ever "let
go" of its assumption that market failure... would be the in-
evitable result of the absence of mandatory disclosure remains
unclear; further, it is another question altogether. Nonetheless,
the S.E.C. should view the international component of securi-
188. Final Ruling, supra note 91, at 54-57.
189. See id. at 57.
190. See Palmiter, supra note 19, at 21-22.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 129.
193. Cohen, supra note 1, at 512.
194. See Palmiter, supra note 19, at 128-29.
792 [Vol. XXVI:2
FOREIGN PRIVATE ISSUERS
ties regulation as a prime experimental ground for well rea-
soned changes in policy.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
While amended Form 20-F incorporates some disclosure
with respect to market risk in its provisions, much work re-
mains to be completed to sufficiently provide valuable market
risk information to investors in international securities. It is
the purpose of this section to introduce some elements of mar-
ket risk that the S.E.C. has overlooked. Moreover, given the
concession that certain ex-ante disclosure is useful and that
the S.E.C. failed to make adequate provisions for market risk
in amended Form 20-F, this analysis turns to recommenda-
tions for future change. Foreign private issuers should be fur-
ther required to disclose management's forward-looking posi-
tions on 3, inflation, foreign currency risk, political risk, and
domestic market correlation with other markets in which the
foreign issuer offers its securities.
This argument rests upon a number of premises. First,
since § 27A.95 of Securities Act provides safe harbor for for-
ward-looking statements,196 the S.E.C. should not merely rec-
ommend such disclosure, but make it mandatory.'97 Second,
MPT holds that investors are rewarded by their willingness to
take on market risk which is derived from information inde-
pendent of firm-specific information.' Third, EMH holds
that all publicly available information should be reflected in a
given security's offering price.'99 That is, securities should re-
flect their fair value at all times."0 Thus, investors making a
transactional decision should base their decision upon whether
195. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (1997).
196. Id. § 27A(i)(1)(F) provides: "'[a] forward-looking statement' means-a state-
ment containing a projection or estimate of such other items as may be specified
by rule or regulation of the Commission." Since 0 and correlation coefficients are
not required by Form 20-F, this definition implies that the S.E.C. could further
amend Form 20-F to require these types of forward-looking information provided
by a firm's management.
197. Such information should be included in mandatory disclosure since it is of
true value to rational investors--"noise traders" have no use for fundamental infor-
mation. Thus, noise theory has no bearing on the argument.
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their future expectations as to market risk differ from that of
the market's.
Form 20-F should contain an Item requiring the issuer to
report its position on possible future directional movements in
their security's P. Inclusion of this information would give in-
vestors the valuable information of how the firm's management
perceived its security to be affected by changes in the market
in the future. Investors would be given additional market risk
information on which a comparison with other securities could
be based. Moreover, investors might be able to arrive at a more
reasoned decision as to whether the addition of the security to
their portfolio would have any expected return effect.
Perhaps the most important forward-looking information
the S.E.C. should require of foreign private issuers is that of
management's opinion regarding how its domestic market may
be correlated with movements in the U.S. market. As noted
above, investments in less than perfectly correlated assets
have the effect of reducing overall portfolio risk while increas-
ing an investor's expected portfolio return.2"' While the
S.E.C. states that foreign private issuers may provide forward-
looking information with respect to "trend information,""2
this information is limited to firm-specific information which
should be of little concern to the well-diversified investor-or for
that matter, "noise traders."
V. CONCLUSION
While the S.E.C. should be lauded for integrating IOSCO's
international disclosure standards into Form 20-F, it missed
the opportunity to further liberalize mandatory disclosure for
foreign private issuers in view of the Commission's goals of
protecting investors, decreasing the cost of capital to foreign
issuers, and facilitating the cross-border flow of capital. No
doubt, policy makers and scholars will continue to closely
watch the increasing internationalization of securities markets.
Also, it follows that there Will be a common refrain to the basic
argument that the S.E.C. must let go of dated assumptions
underlying mandatory disclosure. The fact that the U.S. securi-
ties market remains the most attractive market for raising
201. See GIDDY, supra note 31, at 432-33.
202. See Final Ruling, supra note 91, at 39.
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capital can no longer remain as an excuse for letting such
regulation stand."3 As the costs to foreign issuers in raising
capital in the U.S. continue to increase in relation to other
world capital markets, it will soon be a rational decision for
those issuers to turn to less costly alternatives.
The S.E.C. should continue to view foreign issuers as a
prime experimental group on which to test regulatory reform.
Moreover, it would be best to experiment with mandatory
disclosure reform now. Concern about a regulatory "race to the
bottom," moreover, is a misplaced conception. Nations which
have less stringent disclosure regimes have been pursuing
policies to increase the level of disclosure while the U.S., con-
cededly, has been on a track of shedding regulation. Clearly,
some level of international convergence is at hand. Should not
the S.E.C. attempt to accept its leadership role in discovering
regulatory equilibrium? At the very least the S.E.C. should
continue its efforts to discover what information is now of true
value to the "modern investor."2 4
Trig R. Smith*
203. Relying on the fact that foreign investors have been increasingly accessing
the U.S. market to raise capital in order to support the current regulatory envi-
ronment might prove dangerous to the hegemony of the U.S. capital market. As
foreign markets grow in size and efficiency, the costs of U.S. mandatory disclosure
could become a significant barrier to entry.
204. "[T]he prototypical investor is no longer our helpless and guileless grand-
mother, but has instead become our connected and savvy rich uncle." See Palmiter,
supra note 19, at 3.
* The author would like to dedicate this Note to his mother, Carla, without
whom his life-long ambitions would not have been possible.
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